HAIL, NO: CHANGING THE CHIEF JUSTICE
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Whatever his substantive accomplishments, the late William
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice of the United States reinforced
that office’s distinctive character. Prone to admonish advocates who
1
addressed him merely as “Justice” Rehnquist, he designed spiffy new
robes for himself—inspired, apparently, by the character of the Lord
2
Chancellor in Iolanthe —that were on display during the impeachment trial of President Clinton. This reflected, however idiosyncratically, a widely shared understanding of the importance of the office
and the glory of holding it. Life tenure is a key part of its appeal. William Howard Taft famously preferred being Chief Justice to being
3
President, and John Quincy Adams noted that while “the power of
constructing the law is almost equivalent to the power of enacting
it[, t]he office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is held for life,
that of the President of the United States only for four, or at most for
4
eight, years.”
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when an advocate addressed Rehnquist as “Justice Rehnquist” for a second time,
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the chief justice.’”). Rehnquist reportedly went so far as to write a letter to the Court
clerk, suggesting that lawyers be cautioned against that particular mistake. See Morning
Edition: Relationship Among Supreme Court Justices, as Reflected in Justice Harry Blackmun’s
Notes (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 5, 2004) (describing the contents of Justice Blackmun’s files, which included a copy of this letter).
2
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2003, at 20, 24.
3
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(1969); see also Jeffrey B. Morris, What Heaven Must Be Like: William Howard Taft as Chief
Justice, 1921-30, 1983 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 80, 80.
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9 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 251 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876). Perhaps revealingly, Adams later declined a nomination to become a (mere) Associate Justice, protesting that he was “conscious of too
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The means by which Chief Justice Rehnquist’s term began and
ended also evidenced the singular nature of the job. His promotion
to succeed Warren Burger was hard fought, but it also diverted attention from the nearly simultaneous appointment of Antonin Scalia,
who was nominated to assume Rehnquist’s just-vacated seat as Associate Justice—and who might otherwise have attracted closer scrutiny.
Rehnquist’s death this past summer also illustrated the peculiar character of promotion. John Roberts had already been nominated to
Sandra Day O’Connor’s seat as Associate Justice, but the nomination
was withdrawn so that he could be renominated instead to succeed
Rehnquist. This reinforced the disjunction between the two positions,
and suggested that prior appointment to the Court would no more
have resolved the question of appointment as Chief Justice than would
prior appointment as White House Counsel.
Is this etched in stone? Rehnquist’s robes, at once innovative and
a throwback, hinted not. Gilbert and Sullivan’s Lord Chancellor, who
claimed to “embody the Law,” inhabited an office that American
5
Chief Justices have regarded enviously. But the Lord Chancellor’s
powers have waxed and waned over time, and the House of Lords only
6
recently thwarted a proposal to abolish the office entirely. Traditionally, it was even possible for others—including a commoner or a
committee—to be assigned some of the Lord Chancellor’s duties in7
stead.
Just so for the office of the Chief Justice, where the appointment
process is also a matter of tradition not immune from reconsideration.
Although the office has always been treated as a separate lifetime appointment, subject to Senate confirmation, that does not seem to be
required by the Constitution, and Congress might change things alto-

5

See Peter G. Fish, The Office of Chief Justice of the United States: Into the Federal Judiciary’s Bicentennial Decade, in THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1, 16-17 (1984) (citing
remarks by William Howard Taft and Warren E. Burger). Others, though, have expressly rejected the Lord Chancellor as a model, and have criticized what they perceived as a growing resemblance. See Phillip B. Kurland, The Lord Chancellor of the
United States, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 11, 11, 28 (noting the administrative character
of the lord chancellorship in Britain and arguing that such duties should not be the
task of the American Chief Justice).
6
Patrick Wintour, Peers Vote Against Plans to Abolish Lord Chancellor’s Traditional
Role, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 16, 2005, at 8.
7
Technically, potential assignees include the Lord Keeper and the Lord Commissioners of the Great Seal, respectively. EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 213-14 (2d ed. 1920); see also Note, The Lord High Chancellor and the Great Seal, 27
HARV. L. REV. 70, 70 (1913) (noting that the Lord High Chancellor had entrusted the
Seal to three appointed commissioners).
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gether. Picking Chief Justice Roberts’s successor in a different way—
from among the Justices, by seniority, or by vote of the Justices themselves, and to serve for a limited term—might be a modest step toward
improving the Court’s legitimacy. At the very least, a better understanding of the latitude in the appointment process may prompt a
clearer evaluation of the present system’s costs and benefits.
I. THE OFFICE AND ITS POWERS
The U.S. Constitution only indirectly adverts to a Chief Justice.
Article III provides simply that there will be “one supreme Court” and
8
various “Judges” to populate both it and the lower courts. Article I,
however, mentions the Chief Justice as the person presiding when the
9
Senate is trying a case of impeachment against the President. That’s
it. Section 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 elaborated that “the supreme
court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and five asso10
ciate justices.”
One member of the House objected that the title
“Chief Justice” was “a concomitant of royalty,” but retreated when a
colleague pointed out that the term was already employed in the Con11
stitution.
The title—and the position—has since transcended its constitutional roots. By tradition, the Chief Justice presides over the Court’s
public proceedings, chairs the Justices’ conferences, and assigns opinions in those cases in which she is in the majority. The Chief Justice
also oversees the Court’s administration and lobbies on the Court’s
12
behalf on matters involving its docket and jurisdiction.
But the position has also evolved to take on responsibilities beyond the Court. While the first Chief Justices were each commis-

8

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
10
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
11
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 ( Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording the remarks of
Representatives Burke and Benson during the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789).
12
See ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT
159-213 (1986) (chronicling the Chief Justice’s role in leading the judiciary outside the
courtroom, with emphasis on the political nature of the job); Fish, supra note 5,
at 37-74 (recounting both the internal administrative duties and external representative duties of the Chief Justice); Peter G. Fish, Office of the Chief Justice, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 140, 140-41 (Kermit L.
Hall et al. eds., 1992) (summarizing the Chief Justice’s role as “public advocate[] and
defender[] of the Court” to both the national government and the public); Felix
Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 903-04 (1953) (discussing
the importance of the Chief’s duty to assign authorship of Court opinions).
9
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sioned as “Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,”
Presidents and Chief Justices began to use broader terms like “Lord
14
15
Chief Justice” and “Chief Justice of the Union,” and Congress even16
tually endorsed their use of “Chief Justice of the United States.” The
position’s national responsibilities grew apace. At Chief Justice Taft’s
urging, Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United States,
17
chaired by the Chief Justice, and later created the subordinate Ad18
ministrative Office of the United States Courts. The Chief Justice
has also been made responsible for assigning sitting and retired
19
judges to serve assignments outside of their normal jurisdictions —
which Chief Justice Taft allegedly used to direct judges favoring Prohibition toward “wet” judicial districts, and Chief Justice Burger alleg20
edly used to tilt the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court —and
the office has gradually accrued statutory, legislative, and public relations functions.
The growth in the Chief Justice’s powers has been controversial.
The position’s increasingly diverse responsibilities may, for example,
distract from judging, raise accountability problems owing to life ten21
ure, or endanger the Court’s perceived independence from politics.

13

John M. Daniel, III, “Chief Justice of the United States:” History and Historiography of
the Title, 1983 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 109, 109-10.
14
STEAMER, supra note 12, at 5.
15
Fish, supra note 5, at 9.
16
Daniel, supra note 13, at 111. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase was a particularly
ardent lobbyist for a broader mandate, at the same time urging a reduction in the
number of Justices so as to increase the salaries for those remaining. Id. In his view,
reportedly, “the Chief Justice was separate and distinct from the court, that, as he
stated it, ‘the court was built up around the Chief Justice.’” William A. Richardson,
Chief Justice of the United States, or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States?, 49
NEW ENG. HIST. & GENEOLOGICAL REG. 275, 278 (1895).
17
28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
18
Id. § 601.
19
See id. §§ 291-297 (allowing temporary assignment of circuit judges, district
court judges, judges of the Court of International Trade, and retired Justices or
judges).
20
Fish, supra note 12, at 141. Taft himself had urged far greater authority for the
Chief Justice, including the power to assign new judges on a permanent basis. Judith
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 223, 276 n.285 (2003). For a terrific analysis of the history and constitutionality of
the Chief Justice’s appointment powers, including how it has been exercised in practice, see Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 341 (2004).
21
See Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1031, 1041-45 (1979) (discussing the problems created by the present administrative structure).

2006]

CHANGING THE CHIEF JUSTICE

1713

These missions also raise accountability concerns: government officials often accrete powers for their offices, but mission creep is surely
more troubling when the powers vest in someone with lifetime tenure.
The point for immediate purposes, however, is that Congress
could radically alter this situation. Changing the Chief Justice’s role
in presidential impeachment would seem to require constitutional
22
amendment, but nothing else rises to that level. The nonadjudicative functions are of relatively recent vintage, and, if anything,
are weakly contraindicated by the Framers’ failure to adopt proposals
23
that would have involved the Chief Justice in the legislative process.
The Chief Justice’s responsibilities within the Court may seem worthier of constitutional protection, but the Constitution, recall, only
mentions the Chief Justice in connection with the Senate, and has left
Congress (and, at least in its absence, the Court) free to resolve the
Chief Justice’s more routine adjudicative role. There seems to be
nothing that would prevent the other Justices, acting individually or
collectively, from running the show—a point to bear in mind as we
turn to the appointment process.
II. APPOINTING THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Had the Chief Justice’s modern responsibilities been anticipated
at the nation’s founding, they might have provoked greater deliberation about the appointment process. The records of the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution are silent as to what the founding generation contemplated. To be sure, chief judges were scarcely foreign
to them. Colonial and state judiciaries provided them with a wealth of
experience—for example, half of the first Supreme Court had held an

22

Although, that role has been expanded and contracted without such an amendment. The Senate rules provide that the Chief Justice shall also take responsibility for
presiding over the impeachment of a Vice President serving as acting President. S.
COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 104-1, at rule 103 (1995). On the other hand, Congress by statute
provided for an alternative to the Chief Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (empowering
an Associate Justice to assume the duties of a Chief Justice who becomes disabled); see
also infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the potential conflict between the
statute and the Constitution).
23
But cf. Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP.
CT. REV. 123, 127-30 (arguing that the failure of proposals for a Council of Revision
and a Council of State is not inconsistent with an expectation that that the Justices
would perform some extrajudicial tasks).
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24

analogous office on their states’ highest courts —but it may be
doubted whether these variegated schemes cohered or were mastered
25
by any one of the Framers, and whether they saw much likeness to
26
the Supreme Court they were creating.
Three themes might have been apparent. One was that the chief
justice was widely treated as a separate appointment, hierarchically
27
superior to others of the same tribunal. Second, the chief justice’s
role was often substantively and procedurally dissimilar to any that
might have been contemplated in the U.S. Constitution—for example, because he participated in legislative councils, or served in more
28
than one office at a time. Third, colonial and state courts and their

24

The Fourth Provincial Congress of New York had elected John Jay to be chief
justice of New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature in 1777. 1 The DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 5 (Maeva Marcus
& James R. Perry eds., 1985). William Cushing served twelve years on Massachusetts’
highest court, first as an associate justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court of Judicature, then as its chief justice, then as chief justice of the successor Supreme Judicial
Court. Id. at 26. John Rutledge was chief judge of South Carolina’s first court of
chancery. GEORGE J. LANKEVICH, THE FEDERAL COURT, 1787-1801, at 239 (1986).
25
The possibility that they did not cohere was noted by Max Farrand, in comments on Hamilton’s proposal. See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 618-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (noting the possibility that Convention participants
may not have felt “perfectly acquainted with the judicial systems of all the States, and
therefore could not in advance of discussion decide what phrase should be used to
cover the case of States which did not precisely have a chief judge” for purposes of
fleshing out a proposal for trying impeachments).
26
See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 27, 35-37, 41- 44
(Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (contrasting the court system established by the
Constitution with its contemporaries).
27
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 4-5 (noting evidence of a perceived distinction between the roles of Chief Justice and Associate Justice).
28
In 1779, for example, John Blair, Jr., became chief justice of the Virginia General Court, served as an ex officio member of the first Court of Appeals of Virginia as of
its creation that year, and was elected as one of the three chancellors of the High
Court of Chancery. He was elected a member of a supplemental committee of legislative revisors in 1786, and elected a member of the new Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia in 1789, sometimes holding more than one judicial post at a time, while also
serving as a representative to the constitutional convention and to Virginia’s ratifying
convention. J. Elliot Drinard, John Blair, Jr., in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH
ANNUAL MEETING: THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 436, 439-42 (C.M. Chichester ed., 1927). The powers of the General Court relative to the High Court of Chancery, to the several courts of appeal, and to the courts of trial jurisdiction—not to mention to the legislature—fluctuated considerably. See R.G.H. Kean, Our Judicial System:
Some of Its History, and Some of Its Defects, in REPORT OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 139, 142-43 (Richmond, Va., Everett Waddey
1889); Francis H. McGuire, The General Court of Virginia, in REPORT OF THE SEVENTH
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judges were generally subject to political control—only the number of
judges, means of initial appointment, and tenure were fixed by state
29
constitutions —and details like the appointment of chief justices were
30
often left unresolved. The Constitution, likewise, guaranteed judges’
31
tenure during “good Behaviour” and prevented reductions in salary,
but without inhibiting Congress from changing the Court’s work or
the number of Justices.
Neither the colonies nor the states had many chances to address
how anyone comparable to an Associate Justice might be promoted to
32
become chief justice, and the initial experience under the ConstituANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 197, 202-15 (Richmond,
Va., The Williams Printing Co. 1895).
29
See Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and
American Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 138-47 (describing the treatment of the
judiciary in early state constitutions.
30
In Virginia, for example, the state constitution of 1776 stated only that the Supreme Court of Appeals should consist of “judges,” and the practice evolved of selecting as president the judge with the longest period of continuous service. 2 A.E. DICK
HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 727 (1974). Like Virginia, some of the other state constitutions establishing supreme courts or their equivalents did not specify the existence of a chief justice. See MD. CONST. of 1776, arts.
XLVIII, LVI; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XII; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. III, XXV, XXXII;
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII; PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 20, 23. Other State Constitutions mentioned the office, but did so without specifying the means of the Chief Justice’s selection. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XL. To be sure, a number of state
statutes did address the establishment and composition of supreme courts, including
an office of chief justice. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 92-103
(1940) (describing the relevant state constitutions and statutes prior to 1789). Some
states even specified how the chief justice was to be selected, without providing much
detail. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 12. But no state appears to have immunized
the appointment process from legislative change.
31
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
32
John Blair, Jr., as previously noted, had ascended to become the chief justice for
the Virginia General Court. Under a Virginia law enacted in 1777, judges were to
“have precedence in court as they may stand in nomination on the [legislative] ballot,
and the person first named shall be called Chief Justice of such court,” McGuire, supra
note 28, at 203, but the law did not specify how to handle vacancies. After Blair’s precedessor as chief justice, Joseph Jones, resigned in 1779, Blair appears to have become
chief justice—in practice, if not necessarily through formal commission—due to his
position as the senior-most, second-named judge. See William Brockenrough, Brief
Sketch of the Courts of this Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) at v, x (1826) (charting the
initial appointments to the court and noting the resignation of Joseph Jones); Record
of Proceedings of March 2, 1778, in 2 JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 95 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 1932) (recording the initial appointments to the
Virginia General Court); Email from E. Lee Shepard, Director of Manuscripts and Archives, Va. Historical Soc’y, to Edward Swaine, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School ( June 6, 2005) (on file with author) (noting that Blair took
over as the presiding officer following the resignation of Jones). William Cushing, who
replaced John Adams as chief justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court of Judica-
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33

tion was a blur.
When President Washington appointed the first
slate of Justices, he simply had to designate one, John Jay, as the Chief
34
Justice. When Jay resigned to assume the governorship of New York,
Washington faced the first test of how to replace a Chief Justice. It was
a debacle. He first selected former Justice John Rutledge, who had
left previously to become a state court judge. Rutledge served briefly
with a recess appointment before being rejected by the Senate following a vituperative political speech (against, of all things, the Jay
35
Treaty) that gave rise to rumors that he was mentally unstable.
Washington then delayed nominating a replacement in order to
gauge the interest of Patrick Henry, who failed to provide the Presi36
dent with a timely response. With just weeks before the next sitting,
and having lacked a properly confirmed, sitting Chief Justice for
nearly two years, Washington nominated then-Associate Justice Wil37
liam Cushing. The Senate confirmed Cushing the next day, but he
resigned his commission one week afterward, on health and age
grounds, after serving as Chief Justice for perhaps one dinner party.
Washington finally succeeded with Senator Oliver Ellsworth, though
38
he served only three years as Chief Justice.
Washington’s travails provide only a fleeting and imperfect illustration of how a sitting Justice could be promoted, though some involved tendered their views as to how succession should be managed.
Attorney General Bradford opined that the “principle of Rotation
ture, had been senior associate justice beforehand—and acted as chief justice in Adams’ absence, the latter never having served his appointment. Arthur P. Rugg, William
Cushing, 30 YALE L.J. 128, 131 (1920).
33
Prior national experience, needless to say, was not extensive. One example,
however, was the Continental Congress’s Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, the
presidency of which was apparently selected by lot. 1 HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (1902).
34
See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 33-36
(1922). Even at this early stage, the role of Chief Justice was viewed as distinct from
that of the other Justices. John Rutledge, who had left a position as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court to take a position as chief justice of the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, later lobbied Washington for the chance to succeed
Jay, and his correspondence makes clear that the position as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was the most prestigious of the three. Id. at 127-28 (quoting Letter from
John Rutledge to President George Washington (June 12, 1795)); see also JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 24-25 (1995) (noting
newspaper editorials lobbying for and against candidates to be the first Chief Justice).
35
James R. Perry, Supreme Court Appointments, 1789-1801: Criteria, Presidential Style,
and the Press of Events, 6 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 371, 385-90 (1986).
36
Id. at 393-94.
37
Id. at 394.
38
Id. at 396-97.
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would be the least exceptionable,” because it reduced the judiciary’s
dependence on the President, but added that the prospect of an inappropriate senior-most Associate Justice—he adverted specifically to
39
Justice Cushing—made such a system untenable. The Associate Justices, for their part, seemed to expect that one of their number would
become Chief; Thomas Jefferson, writing before Cushing’s selection,
speculated that the initial Rutledge nomination “seems to have been
intended merely to establish a precedent against the descent of that
office by seniority, and to keep five mouths always gaping for one
40
sugar plumb.” Following the appointment of Cushing, one Federalist worried “that the promotion . . . will form a precedent for making
Chief Justices from the eldest Judge, tho’ other candidates may be
41
much better qualified.”
Afterward, a practice developed that no Associate Justice should be
promoted to Chief Justice. Lincoln and Grant reportedly turned
42
against internal candidates on principle, and President Cleveland seriously offended Justice Stephen J. Field by looking outside the Court
43
to select Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller. President Taft, trying to
entice Charles Evans Hughes into becoming Associate Justice, confided that he did not “regard the practice of never promoting associ-

39

Letter from William Bradford, Jr., to Samuel Bayard ( June 4, 1795), in 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800,
supra note 24, at 755. Cf. Letter from Tench Coxe to Richard Henry Lee (Apr. 11,
1792), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 24, at 735 (noting personal conviction that the office of
the Chief Justice, and those of the cabinet secretaries, “should be put on such a footing
that when vacant they should be unclog’d by the pretensions of any subordinate officer
whatever,” preferring the “man of first abilities,” so that “dull seniority and length of
service should be considered as nothing”).
40
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Mar. 2, 1796), in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra
note 24, at 841; see also WARREN, supra note 34, at 128-29 (providing the context of Jefferson’s statement).
41
Letter from William Plumer to Jeremiah Smith (Feb. 19, 1796), in 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800,
supra note 24, at 838; see also WARREN, supra note 34, at 139-40 (providing the context
of Plumer’s statement).
42
Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States, supra note 3, at 51-52. The evidence
as to the latter, at least, seems weak; Lincoln appears to have made his selection as a
matter of political pragmatism, after giving serious consideration to Justice Swayne. See
DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 197-202 (1956) (discussing the political
pressures on Lincoln to nominate Salmon P. Chase).
43
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at
17 (1995); CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 319 (Archon Books 1963) (1930).
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ate justices as one to be followed” (without, he added in a postscript,
44
promising Hughes the promotion outright).
Taft did not in fact
promote Justice Hughes, and rejected the aspirations of senior Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan, exclaiming that “I won’t make the
position of chief justice a blue ribbon for the final years of any mem45
ber of the court.” But Taft did ultimately break tradition by promoting sitting Associate Justice Edward Douglas White. Then-Associate
Justice Stone was promoted subsequently (immediately following
Chief Justice Hughes, who had been nominated after a period away
from the Court), as was Justice Rehnquist. All told—but excluding
Justice Cushing—three of the sixteen Chief Justices who have served
to date have been promoted from within the Court, all of them during
this century.
III. CHANGING THE CHIEF
At present, then, a sitting Justice may neither count on nor exclude the possibility of promotion. This is arguably meritocratic, but
the resulting uncertainty may be the worst of both worlds. The reasons for maintaining the promotion option are probably self-evident.
Experience on the Court (to a point) may be helpful in leading it.
That is the premise, presumably, of making the senior Associate Jus46
tice the Court’s second-in-command, and the basis for some criti47
cisms of inexperienced outsiders becoming Chief Justice. There are
also incentive effects to consider. Reducing the odds that able Associate Justices may be considered for Chief Justice may make it harder to
retain them; it is human nature to grow dissatisfied when those less
experienced are brought in at a higher position, at least where later
advancement seems foreclosed. In theory, it may even make it harder
44

Daniel S. McHargue, President Taft’s Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12 J. POL.
478, 488-89 (1950).
45
Id. at 492.
46
See 28 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (authorizing the senior Associate Justice to assume the
Chief Justice’s powers when the Chief Justice is incapacitated or the office is vacant).
The succession is also traditional in character. See Sandra L. Wood, In the Shadow of the
Chief: The Role of the Senior Associate Justice, J. SUP. CT. HIST., July 1997, at 25, 26-29 (noting the various instances in which the senior Associate Justice has presided over the
Court).
47
See, e.g., 1 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 278 (1951) (citing criticisms
of the inexperience of Chief Justices Waite and Fuller). One may view the same cases
differently, of course, see Jeffrey B. Morris, Chief Justice Edward Douglass White and President Taft’s Court, 1982 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 27, 39 (describing Waite and Fuller as
comparatively more successful Chief Justices than Edward Douglass White), and there
are certainly inexperienced but accomplished Chief Justices, such as Earl Warren.
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to recruit Associate Justices in the first place—witness Taft’s felt need
48
to reassure Hughes in recruiting him to the Associate ranks —though
it is unlikely to be too dissuasive.
On the other hand, the prospect of promotion may make sitting
Justices solicit political favor—something that led former Justice Owen
Roberts, later Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, to
urge that Associate Justices ought never be considered for Chief Jus49
tice.
The specter of political advantage risks relations within the
Court as well as the Court’s standing. Justice Field’s disappointment
at losing out was nothing compared to the stunning episode in which
Justice Jackson publicized Court feuds in a fury over Justice Black’s
50
supposed plotting against Jackson’s aspirations to be Chief Justice.
Subsequent charges of presidential cronyism also helped to derail the
promotion of Justice Fortas and tarnished the Warren Court (though
it seems unlikely that Fortas’s political activities were intended to ad51
vance his judicial career). The close and continuing relationships
many Presidents have had with their Chief Justices—including instances in which Chief Justices White, Taft, Vinson, Warren, and Bur52
ger advised on political matters —raise at least an appearance of a
cooperative relationship beforehand as well, undermining the perception of judicial independence.
To bar or discourage promotions, however, is a serious overcorrection if the problem stems from the need for Associate Justices to
run the nomination and confirmation gauntlets. Why is it, exactly,
that a sitting Justice, imbued with life tenure on the Court, must be
nominated and confirmed anew in order to become Chief Justice?
Clearly, separate appointments are not unconstitutional—the uncontroversial promotions of Justice Cushing and Justice White look like
53
proof positive. If Congress wishes to create a separate office of the
Chief Justice, and to make any would-be occupant subject to confirmation, it is at liberty to do so.

48

But see Morris, supra note 47, at 35 (speculating that had Charles Evans Hughes
declined an appointment as Associate Justice, “he probably would have been named
Chief Justice”).
49
Owen J. Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court’s Independence, 35
A.B.A. J. 1, 2 (1949).
50
Howard Ball & Phillip Cooper, Fighting Justices: Hugo L. Black and William O.
Douglas and Supreme Court Conflict, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 26-27 (1994).
51
See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 337-42 (1990).
52
Fish, supra note 5, at 131-33.
53
See KALMAN, supra note 51, at 335; Perry, supra note 35, at 394.
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What is less clear, however, is whether promotions need to take this
form. Tradition, certainly, would have it so, and deserves some deference. But the relevant tradition is really a longstanding political practice, rather than some purer constitutional understanding, since the
practice of separately confirming candidates for Chief Justice has been
overdetermined. Prior to the Taft administration—the glancing instance of Cushing aside—separate confirmation was always necessary
so that a newcomer could become a “judge” on the Supreme Court.
Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 and successor statutes failed to distinguish between internal and external candidates for Chief Justice, it
was inevitable that the rare nomination of a current Justice for promotion would be subjected to the same process. The question is open,
accordingly, whether a statute might instead differentiate candidates
for promotion and provide for their elevation by some other means—
and some of the possible mechanisms turn out to be surprisingly traditional.
A. A Seniority Carousel
Presidents have always been able to choose (or avoid choosing) a
Chief Justice based on seniority. But could Congress instead dictate
that the senior-most Associate Justice automatically serve as Chief? The
obvious risk would be promoting Justices who are past their prime,
and unduly encouraging longer service on the Court. Recent scholarship has documented numerous instances of decrepitude on the Supreme Court and noted repeated proposals to amend the Constitu54
tion in order to establish a retirement age for Justices.
Reforming the Supreme Court through a constitutional amendment is not a very likely prospect, whatever its merits, but age or term
limits for Chief Justices could be imposed without going down that
cumbersome path—since those are not, after all, matters addressed in
the Constitution. One model is provided by the statute governing the
54

See ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 231-32 (2003) (discussing Justice Marshall’s casting of an incorrect vote and Justice Black’s confusion during oral arguments); David J.
Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th
Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1086-87 (2000) (proposing, after a discussion of
mental decrepitude, adoption of a constitutional amendment mandating retirement of
Supreme Court Justices at age seventy-five); see also Merlo J. Pusey, The Court Copes with
Disability, 1979 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 63 (describing the degree to which disability
affected the workings of particular Courts). But see DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE
BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE END (1999) (providing a slightly less pessimistic account).
THE
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federal courts of appeals, which designates as chief judge the seniormost judge under the age of sixty-five with at least one year of service
and without a prior stint as chief judge—and which limits terms to
55
seven years. Following suit for the Supreme Court would not only
limit the age of any Associate Justice upon promotion, and limit the
length of service as Chief, but it would also have subtler effects. For
example, this kind of seniority carousel may actually reduce the Justices’ mean age by establishing a natural juncture for exit: a senior
Associate Justice’s promotion to Chief Justice might serve as a nice way
to “round out” a judicial career (as Associate Justice John Marshall
56
Harlan once wistfully remarked), or at least make returning to the
rank and file unappealing.
Longevity effects aside, such a scheme would also diminish the
opportunity for strategic behavior by the Justices. Predetermining
promotion would substantially reduce the incentives for any Justice to
show favor to those in (or soon to be in) political power—for example, in cases involving fundamental presidential or senatorial prerogatives. It would also diminish the occasions for alleging such favoritism
and, more generally, for the politicized examination of the Court’s
work. Promotions are the least attractive species of judicial appointment. Every Associate Justice was confirmed by the Senate, of course,
before joining the Court, so the only question is further review—review
of a kind that is more intrusive and less deferential than would have
been expected in 1789. Justice Cushing was confirmed the day after
57
his surprise nomination, and the Senate confirmed the promotions
of Justice White and Justice Stone while honoring their submission
58
Justice Fortas,
that it would be inappropriate for them to testify.
however was not so lucky, nor was Justice Rehnquist—although, despite close scrutiny, the Fortas hearings actually failed to expose the

55

28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000); see also id. § 258 (providing for seniority-based promotion of the chief judge of the Court of International Trade). This method is not ubiquitous. See id. § 171(b) (authorizing presidential appointment of the chief judge of the
Court of Federal Claims).
56
Wood, supra note 46, at 32.
57
Perry, supra note 35, at 394.
58
KALMAN, supra note 51, at 335. To the extent that judicial independence was
being honored, one would expect nominees from the lower federal courts to be
granted the same leeway, as has sometimes been the case. See Charles M. Lamb, Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger: A Conservative Chief for Conservative Times, in THE BURGER
COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 129, 132 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C.
Halpern eds., 1991) (noting that Burger’s testimony during confirmation hearings was
short and friendly).
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59

scandal that later drove him from the Court, and the Rehnquist
hearings pretermitted sensitive questions regarding his previous ill
60
health. The virtual certainty that modern sitting Justices would be
examined on their Supreme Court records poses, at the very least, the
risk of reducing the immunity and independence of the Court.
Compared to the alternatives, a seniority-based system doesn’t
61
look so bad. Its main hurdle may be a perceived inconsistency with
the Constitution. For one, the President would lose the right of initiative, which may have certain tactical consequences. For example, the
Reagan administration’s experience, as noted above, supposedly
demonstrated the wisdom of a two-nomination strategy: that is, reacting to a vacancy at Chief Justice by first attempting to promote a controversial (but confirmable) Associate Justice, then following with a
more polarizing candidate for the resulting vacancy after the political
62
opposition has been exhausted.
It is doubtful, though, that such
gambits are constitutionally protected.
The weightier objection is that a seniority carousel would reduce
the role of both political branches in selecting the next Chief Justice—
not only controlling the selection from among the Associate Justices,
but also excluding the possibility of nominating someone from outside the Court. That concern is substantial, but its constitutional basis
is not unassailable. While the strongest textual basis for a permanent,
separately appointed office of the Chief Justice is its brief mention in
the Impeachment Clause, a countervailing consideration is the legislative authority to regulate the meaning of the “judges” mentioned in
Article III. The latter authority has clear relevance here. Conceptually, any seniority proposal effectively reconceives all appointments as
being to the position of “Justice, eligible for succession to Chief Justice,” rather than to the position of “(non-chief) Associate Justice.” In
other words, Congress might decide that being Chief Justice is simply
a potential, latent attribute of being a Justice—manifested through

59

See KALMAN, supra note 51, at 359-76 (discussing the subsequent exposure of
Fortas’s involvement with a financier who was under investigation by the SEC).
60
See Garrow, supra note 54, at 1066-69 (describing the Senate’s conscious avoidance of questions regarding Rehnquist’s previous use of pain medication).
61
As Judge Feinberg once put it, evoking Churchill, “seniority is the worst way to
select a chief judge, except for all the other ways.” Wilfred Feinberg, The Office of Chief
Judge of a Federal Court of Appeals, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 373 (1984).
62
See Joan A. Lukey, Op-Ed., Beyond Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing a New Chief Justice
Is a Complex Game, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, at M1 (noting Reagan’s “packaging” strategy, and suggesting that President George W. Bush could employ it to better effect).
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63

details to the position of Chief Justice —rather than a discrete office
requiring political supervision on a piecework basis.
The idea is not as radical as it may sound. As presently structured,
the Chief Justice looks like an “officer” of a kind requiring appoint64
ment pursuant to Article II. But case law holds that those already
commissioned as officers per the Appointments Clause do not necessarily require a separate appointment in order to assume additional
duties, thus redeeming the statutory assignment of military officers to
65
be military judges or members of a commission on public park66
land. Such transfers are permitted so long as those duties are ger67
mane to the original office (which is plainly true for movement
within the Court) and so long as Congress is not “trying to both create
68
an office and also select a particular individual to fill the office” (and
the premise of a seniority carousel, of course, is that political control
69
of Chief-designation is, if anything, diminished). The Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission,
and its recognition that Congress may subject Article III judges to an
additional appointments process before giving them new responsibilities, does not suggest that it must do so, and the Court cited instances
in which such responsibilities had been assigned without any such
70
hurdle. Indeed, the Court cited the Chief Justice’s own ex officio du71
ties, which are an embarrassment to any appointments objection to a
seniority carousel; some of these assignments, like the Chief Justice’s
inclusion in the Sinking Fund Commission established in 1806, are
deeply rooted in the constitutional tradition and were not regarded as

63

Cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1994) (citing examples in which
military officers are detailed to separate, statutorily created positions without the requirement of a separate appointment).
64
See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (indicating that when a
judicial office is “‘established by Law,’ and the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute,” individuals occupying that position are
likely to be viewed, at a minimum, as “inferior Office[rs]” subject to Article II confirmation) (citation omitted).
65
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 169-76.
66
Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300-01 (1893).
67
Id. at 301.
68
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 174.
69
None of this is to say, of course, that Congress could not choose to require a
second appointment process, as it has for example with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Id. at 171.
70
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398-401 (1989).
71
Id. at 400 n.24.
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72

raising Appointments Clause problems. Any constitutional infirmity
would also call into question the statute designating chief judges for
the courts of appeals, which must be premised on the distinction between the tenure of a federal judge and the tenure of her stint as chief
judge.
One might nevertheless insist that the express constitutional mention of the Chief Justice (and not, say, the chief judge of the D.C. Circuit) makes all the difference. This could be resolved by retaining a
“Chief Justice,” selected as at present, to do the only thing mentioned
in the Constitution—preside over impeachment of the President—
and creating a different officer (say, the “Principal Justice”), selected
on seniority, to discharge all the other responsibilities presently assigned to the Chief. Even doing that would do more than the Impeachment Clause requires. It seems unlikely that the Framers designated the Chief Justice in order to avoid having other members of the
Supreme Court preside; the idea, presumably, was to designate some
member of the brethren to serve in lieu of the Vice President, who
73
otherwise might affect whether he would succeed to the Presidency.
(If anything, the Clause’s general theme—to reduce the role of executive branch politics in the impeachment process—would favor employing a Justice selected with the least amount of presidential intervention.) Finally, if the Impeachment Clause means that only a
person confirmed as Chief Justice will do, it would condemn the existing law that allows the senior Associate Justice to serve if and to the ex74
tent that the Chief Justice becomes disabled. Whatever the merits of
the present scheme, and however steeped in tradition it may be, it is
difficult to defend as a constitutional necessity.
B. A College of Cardinals
Once liberated from the confirmation process, the position of
Chief Justice might be filled from among the sitting Justices in a num-

72

See Wheeler, supra note 23, at 139- 44 (discussing the Chief Justice’s early service
on the Sinking Fund Commission); 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 929 (1852) (statement of
Rep. Randolph) (suggesting that Commissioners on the Sinking Fund Commission
“are not, strictly speaking, officers,” since “[t]he duties they discharge are ex officio . . .
and, as Commissioners, they receive no salary”).
73
Letter from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase to the Senate of the United States
(Mar. 4, 1868), in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, at 256.
74
28 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (“Whenever the Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties of his office or the office is vacant, his powers and duties shall devolve upon the
associate justice next in precedence who is able to act . . . .”).
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ber of ways, not just by seniority. For example, a statute could provide
that the Justices themselves could elect their Chief, not unlike the way
the College of Cardinals chooses the Pope (though the Pope, it turns
75
out, need not have been a Cardinal).
Like the seniority carousel, such an approach has legal antecedents. The State of Florida, for example, lets a majority of its justices
76
decide on the chief justice—by tradition, for a two-year term. The
consistency with the U.S. Constitution is certainly less clear, but still
compelling. Under Article II, Section 2, Congress is free to “vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper” in,
77
among others, “the Courts of Law.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has held that the chief judge of the U.S. Tax Court—acting as one of
those “Courts of Law” despite its non-Article III status—may be statutorily assigned the power to appoint special trial judges who exercise
substantial discretion, including the power to decide certain cases and
78
to propose findings in others. By comparison, vesting an entire Article III court with the power to select a Chief Justice from among the
Justices seems unexceptionable, at least so long as the statute delineates the duties of a Chief Justice additional to those powers already
possessed by virtue of prior appointment.
A College of Cardinals system would also recognize the degree to
which the Court is already self-regulating. The practice of letting the
Chief Justice assign opinions, for example, is a substantial power, but
exceeding its traditional bounds risks a fierce backlash, at least by the
79
Court’s mavericks.
This self-regulation has, in fact, sometimes
touched on questions of tenure. Justices have advised their elderly

75

Interestingly, John Paul II regarded it as “an indisputable principle that the
Roman Pontiff has the right to define and adapt to changing times the manner of designating the person called to assume the Petrine succession in the Roman See.” John
Paul II, Apostolic Constitution, Universi Dominici Gregis (Feb. 22, 1996), pmbl., available
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/ (follow “Universi Dominici Gregis” hyperlink). So why not the Chief Justice?
76
REV. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2; FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.030(a)(2)(A); see also Joseph
A. Boyd, Jr. & Randall Reder, A History of the Florida Supreme Court, 35 U. MIA. L. REV.
1019, 1051 (1981) (explaining the Florida rule).
77
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
78
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870-71, 888-91 (1991).
79
Justice Douglas, for example, objected vigorously when he perceived that Chief
Justice Burger was usurping the right of the senior Associate Justice in the majority to
make the opinion assignment in cases in which the Chief Justice was dissenting.
Wood, supra note 46, at 29. Justice McReynolds, in an earlier episode, supposedly told
a messenger sent by Chief Justice Hughes, “Tell the Chief Justice that I don’t work for
him.” STEAMER, supra note 12, at 21.
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colleagues that they are too old to continue serving, or even conspired to deprive them of their full authority—usually by limiting
81
opinion-writing assignments.
(The colleagues of Justice McKenna
and Justice Douglas, however, went so far as to decide that neither of
82
them should cast deciding votes.)
Sitting and departing Justices
have also advised Presidents regarding the best choice for a successor
83
Chief Justice.
Making the Justices responsible for electing a Chief Justice would
be somewhat more transparent. It is also more facile. As then-Justice
Rehnquist admitted, judges have a tendency toward “pulling the wagons around” when it comes to matters of their health and compe84
tence. This reticence mainly marks their willingness to disclose their
infirmities to the outside world, but it also tends to make them tardy
85
in confronting colleagues with the need to retire. No Justice, more86
over, needs to accept such advice.
Allowing the Justices to determine their leader makes intervening on the basis of age and health
easier: not only is demotion a less bitter pill than resignation, but the
Justices’ action can be decisive rather than merely advisory. Judges
have long recognized, in principle, the possibility of decrepitude—
Charles Evans Hughes, between spells on the Court, urged a mandatory retirement policy, and Judge Richard Posner, limited to a term as
chief judge, described the judiciary as “the nation’s premier geriatric
80

This occurred, for example, with Justices Grier, Field, McKenna, and Holmes.
Garrow, supra note 54, at 1004, 1009, 1015-16, 1018.
81
WARD, supra note 54, at 116-19, 186-89; Garrow, supra note 54, at 1015-16, 105456.
82
WARD, supra note 54, at 118, 187-88; Garrow, supra note 54, at 1015, 1053. Ward
and Garrow also report that Justice Rutledge (and possibly Justice Black) cast votes on
behalf of an ailing Justice Murphy. WARD, supra note 54, at 148; Garrow, supra note 54,
at 1027.
83
See WARD, supra note 54, at 170 (revealing Warren’s apparent intent to recommend a successor); Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 6 n.10, 8 (1967) (noting consultations prior to the nominations of Hughes and
Stone); McHargue, supra note 44, at 492 (noting consultations between Taft and the
entire Court prior to the nomination of Justice White); Morris, supra note 47, at 34
(describing advice presented by Justice Harlan to President Taft).
84
Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 206 (1986).
85
Garrow’s article, supra note 54, is essentially a criticism of prior opinion that the
practice of collegial intervention was sufficient.
86
According to one well-known anecdote, Justice Harlan was sent to ask an aging
Justice Field if he recalled his own intercession with Justice Grier some years before.
Justice Field replied, “Yes! And a dirtier day’s work I never did in my life!” CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION,
METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 76 (1928).
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87

occupation” —and might be given better tools for self-help before
any clumsier limits on judicial terms are hazarded.
CONCLUSION
Needless to say, upsetting the scheme for selecting Chief Justices
after over 200 years is no mean feat, and less ambitious changes may
be preferable. One compromise would be to combine a promotion
mechanism with more traditional avenues for appointment. A statute
might provide, for example, that the President may nominate any
candidate for Chief Justice, but that if she does not—or if no candidate is confirmed—another promotion mechanism would kick in
(yielding, for example, the promotion of the senior-most Associate
Justice for a term of years). Better still, the statute might defer to a
statutory promotion mechanism unless and until the President overrode that Chief Justice with a separately nominated candidate, having
convinced the Senate that the new candidate was superior to the incumbent. Either method seems hard to criticize, particularly since existing law provides that the senior Associate Justice may serve in lieu of
88
the Chief Justice, without even the safeguard of a limited term. Either would also allow nomination of a newcomer as Chief Justice,
which may be a necessary option to preserve for coping with an aging
or dysfunctional court. Of course, if the political branches genuinely
feared losing control of the Court, they could always compensate by
diminishing the Chief Justice’s statutory responsibilities.
In any event, having recently filled the position of Chief Justice—
thus enabling a more dispassionate examination of the office, rather
than of a particular nominee or nominator—the time is propitious for
reconsidering it. Chief Justice Rehnquist recently presided over only
the second impeachment of a President, receiving good marks. It is
easy to see how only good fortune prevented the trial from being
marred by allegations of favoritism—imagine the protests if President
Clinton’s successful defense had been presided over by a Clintonselected Chief Justice, or if Chief Justice Rehnquist had taken debatable positions that resulted in Clinton’s removal. Recent debates over
the filibuster have shown the persistence of ideological rifts over judi-
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Garrow, supra note 54, at 997 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD
AGE 180 (1995)).
88
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. For an account of some instances in
which this has happened, none appearing to have exceeded six months, see Wood,
supra note 46, at 26-29.
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cial appointments, boding ill for future nominations to the Supreme
Court. If we desire constructive, rather than destructive, political dialogue over the choice of a Chief Justice, it is better to consider the issue systematically, including consideration of the proper method for
choosing, and not just the individuals as they arise.

